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The Threat of Force as an Action in
Self-Defense Under International Law
James A. Green*
FrancisGrimal+
ABSTRACT

Self-defense is a universally accepted exception to the prohibition
of the use of force in internationallaw, and it has been subjected to
careful academic scrutiny. The prohibition of the threat of force,
although equally important in terms of its normative status to the
prohibition on use, has attracted far less academic commentary to
date. This Article examines the relationship between the two
prohibitions-ofthe use and threat of force-and considers the largely
unexplored possibility of states utilizing a threat of force as a means of
lawful defensive response: self-defense in the form of a threat. The
status of this concept under international law is assessed, and the
criteriathat may regulate it are analyzed. This Article is based on an
analogy between traditional "forcible" self-defense and the notion of
threats made in self-defense. However, one cannot automatically
apply the well-established rules of self-defense to a defensive threat,
largely because of the practical differences between a threatened
response and a response involving actual force.
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A bully is not reasonable.
He is persuadedonly by threats.
-Marie de France, late twelfth century

I. INTRODUCTION
The prohibition of the threat of force stands directly alongside its
loftier counterpart, the prohibition of the use of force, in Article 2(4)
of the United Nations Charter.' Yet, although states continually
reference the prohibition of the use of military force (even while
breaking it), the scope and nature of the prohibition of the threat of
force has found little articulation in state practice. This discrepancy
is also apparent in the writings of scholars. As such, numerous
questions remain unanswered with regard to the status of threats of
force in international law. This Article considers one such issue: the
relationship between the prohibition of the threat of force and the
international law governing self-defense.
In contrast to the legal status of threats of force generally, the
lawfulness of forcible self-defense taken in response to a threat of
force has been exhaustively, and exhaustingly, discussed in the
academic literature. This debate over the lawfulness of "anticipatory"
and "preemptive" self-defense has raged all the more fiercely since
the atrocities of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent "war on

1.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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terror."2 However, the literature has left the inverted question,
whether self-defense can be manifested by way of a threat of force,
Therefore, it is not our intention to
almost entirely unasked.3
examine the question of whether military force taken in self-defense
may be lawful in response to a threat. Instead, we ask whether a
threat of force (a prima facie unlawful action under Article 2(4)4) can
gain the status of lawfulness if taken as a defensive response, and,
assuming that it can, we ask what criteria may be used to determine
the lawfulness of such a defensive threat. This Article thus examines
the legality of threats made in self-defense, which may also be
referred to as "countervailing threats."5
In 1996, as discussed in Part II, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) concluded that a threat of force is unlawful when the

2.
Maogoto gives a useful overview of the main arguments concerning this
issue and provides a survey of the vast literature. JACKSON N. MAOGOTO, BATTLING
TERRORISM: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF FORCE AND THE WAR ON TERROR 111-

49 (2005); see also Christine Gray, The US National Security Strategy and the New
"Bush Doctrine" on Preemptive Self-Defense, 1 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 437, 438 (2002)
(describing the "radical new doctrine of international law on the use of force");
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 8 (2003) (noting that some
commentators have called for amendment to the UN Charter); Christian M.
Henderson, The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States: The Pre-Emptive
Use of Force and the PersistentAdvocate, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 2 (2007)
(characterizing the 2006 reassertion of the doctrine of preemptive military action as
"surprising"); Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-Emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
209, 210 (2003) (noting that traditional deterrence is ineffective against terrorists); see
generally Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 599 (2003) (arguing that the United States should refine its position on the
preemptive use of force).
A limited number of scholars have briefly discussed the notion of threats of
3.
force made in self-defense. Currently, the only systematic treatment of the issue is in
Nikolas Stiirchler's landmark book on the threat of force. NIKOLAS STURCHLER, THE
THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 218-51 (2007). But see FRANCIS GRIMAL,
THREATS OF FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STRATEGY (forthcoming 2012)

(manuscript on file with author). For more limited comment, see J. CRAIG BARKER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 129-34 (2000) (discussing permissible threats of force); HILAIRE
McCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 60-61

(1992) (discussing permissible responses to threats of force within the self-defense
framework); Dino Kritsiotis, Close Encounters of a Sovereign Kind, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L.
299, 306-08 (2009) (discussing threats as a form of self-defense); Matthew A. Myers,
Deterrence and the Threat of Force Ban: Does the UN Charter Prohibit Some Military
Exercises?, 162 MIL. L. REV. 132, 169 (1999) (discussing the scholarly debate on the
continuing importance of UN Charter Article 2(4)); Marco Roscini, Threats of Armed
Force and Contemporary International Law, 54 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 229, 237 (2007)
(discussing threats as self-defense); Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 239, 250-51, 256-57 (1988) (identifying this type of action as "self-help" rather than
"self-defense").
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting "the threat or use of force against
4.
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations").
STORCHLER, supra note 3, at 218.
5.
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force threatened would itself be unlawful, and that, correspondingly,
the threat to use force in a lawful manner is itself lawful. 6 If this
conclusion is accepted, "not only is every threat illegal where force is
illegal, but, obviously, any justification put forward for the use of
force will work equally well for the threat of such force." 7 Self-defense
is a universally accepted exception, enshrined in both Article 51 of
the UN Charter and in customary international law, to the general
prohibition of the use of force. 8 Therefore, countervailing threats of
force may be lawful if the threatened force meets the criteria
regulating the actual use of force in self-defense.
Although a handful of other writers have also reached this
conclusion,9 none have taken the obvious next step and considered
the criteria by which such a concept would be assessed. This Article
aims to take that step, based on the core premise that defensive
threats should be viewed as broadly analogous to "traditional" selfdefense through the use of force. Having said this, it is not simply
the case that the rules for the use of force in self-defense can be
directly transposed to instances where a threat is employed. The use
of force and the threat of force, while conceptually cut from the same
legal cloth, are practically different actions with practically different
consequences."o Therefore, the analogy to "traditional" self-defense
is, on occasion, necessarily departed from or stretched.
This basic assumption is nonetheless an important starting point
because there is little legal guidance beyond it as to the criteria
required to turn an unlawful threat of force into a lawful one. As
previously noted, there is only a very small amount of literature on
the notion of threats made in self-defense. Moreover, states simply do
not make the explicit legal claim that the wrongfulness of any given
threat is precluded because that threat constituted an act of selfdefense. Analysis of state practice provides little to indicate how
customary international law treats threats in self-defense, because
states do not tend to respond to this issue in legal terms: "Practice
does not seem sufficiently unambiguous to make unfailingly
intelligible distinctions among genuine approval of acts of self-help,

6.

See infra text accompanying note 40.

7.
STURCHLER, supra note 3, at 41; see also IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 364 (1963).

8.
Christopher P.M. Waters & James A. Green, International Law: Military
Force and Armed Conflict, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MODERN
WARFARE 289, 294-98 (George Kassimeris & John Buckley eds., 2010).
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
9.
10.
The authors take the position that a threat of force simply cannot "have the
same destructive consequences as the use of force." Sadurska, supra note 3, at 250.
However, for a contrary view, see Roscini, supra note 3, at 245 ("Reactions [by states]
to violations of Article 2(4) differ not depending on whether the victim is the object of a
threat or of a use of force, but on the political interests of the concerned states and on
the outcome of the conduct.").
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reluctant acquiescence in them and resigned recognition of a fait
accompli.""
Therefore, the discussion that follows is necessarily
indeed, somewhat tentative.12
and,
speculative
Nevertheless, states certainly do make threats, in a manner
analogous to a use of force in self-defense, in response to a prior use
(or threat) of force against them.' 3 The question, then, is whether
such threats should be considered lawful and, if so, on what basis. In
tackling that question, it is important to note that this Article does
not propose a reform of the current legal regime. Instead, it examines
whether the existing framework already provides for the lawfulness
of threats of force in the context of a defensive response and how the
regulation of such actions should be explicitly assessed.
Part II briefly sets out the nature and scope of the prohibition of
the threat of force in international law and its relationship to the
prohibition of the use of force. Part III outlines the key traditional
criteria for self-defense. Part IV examines whether the notions of
non-forcible self-defense, generally, and self-defense by way of a
threat, specifically, are even conceptually possible. It concludes that
there is nothing to preclude states from manifesting self-defense in
this way and, moreover, that countervailing threats are a logical
aspect of the existing system. Part V argues that the threat of force
in self-defense is not only conceptually possible under the current
law, but that it is a desirable feature of it. Finally, Part VI examines
how such a manifestation of the right of self-defense may be
regulated, based on the existing criteria for self-defense as commonly
understood.

II. THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The absolute prohibition against the inter-state threat of force is
14
contained in the first limb of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Unfortunately, Article 2(4) itself offers little concrete guidance as to
what conduct triggers a breach of the prohibition of the threat of
force. Indeed, the Charter remains silent as to how international law

11.
Sadurska, supra note 3, at 252.
This also means that the "state practice" approach, taken by Stirchler in
12.
the most comprehensive attempt to date to analyze the question of countervailing
threats, is ultimately of relatively limited value; the lack of clear legal state
argumentation in this context means the conclusions Stirchler reaches based on the
practice he cites, see STURCHLER, supra note 3, at 218-51, are inevitably somewhat
tenuous. Therefore, this Article deliberately approaches the issue from a more abstract
perspective, applying the existing law of self-defense, so far as possible, to the question
of countervailing threats.
See infra Part IV for some examples of this state practice.
13.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting "the threat or use of force
14.
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state").
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defines (or should define) a threat of force. This deficiency has led to
academic debate as to what a threat of force actually entails and at
what point a "threat" violates Article 2(4).15 To constitute a breach of
the prohibition, must a threat of force be delivered as a classic verbal
ultimatum-"comply or else"? Can nonverbal actions, such as
conducting military exercises, also constitute threats of force in prima
facie violation of the prohibition? This second question is particularly
relevant to the relationship between threats and self-defense: a state
may nonverbally communicate a defensive threat, for example, by
positioning troops on its borders. 16
This Part briefly sets out general understandings of the threat of
force as regulated by international law. It first considers the legal
source of the prohibition of the threat of force, through reference to
the UN Charter and other quasi-statutory material. It then considers
the extent to which the ICJ has examined the threat of force and
highlights how the Court has conceptually "coupled" threats with the
use of force. Finally, this Part sets out a typology of threats to use
force that states may make in international relations.
A. The Source of the Prohibitionof the Threat of Force
Like the prohibition of the use of force, the prohibition of the
threat of force is binding on all members of the United Nations
because it is explicitly provided for in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."' 7

For example, Sadurska's approach is very much one of categorization and is
15.
based on the type of behavior that may constitute a threat. Sadurska, supra note 3, at
245. Conversely, Lauren posits that threats of force rest on a scale ranging from the
innocuous to the more extreme threat of force. Paul G. Lauren, Ultimata and Coercive
Diplomacy, 16 INT'L STUDIES Q. 131, 145 (1972). Others are more concerned with the
purpose of the threat. STtORCHLER, supra note 3, at 218-51; Roscini, supra note 3, at
235.
16.
Take, for example, recent defensive posturing by the Lebanese army on its
borders with Israel in response to what was termed Israeli "war games." Lebanon
Boosts Defense Near S Border, PRESSTV (May 27,
2010, 9:32 AM),
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/127951.html.
17.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. It is generally accepted that the prohibition of
the use of force is also universally binding under customary international law. See, e.g.,
Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
227, 228 (2003) ("[Tjhe prohibition of the use of force is a valid norm of customary
international law. . . ."); Hermann Mosler, The International Society as a Legal
Community, 140 RECUEIL DE COURS 1, 283 (1974). Whether this is also true for the
prohibition of the threat of force is debatable given the lack of clear articulation of the
prohibition in state practice. However, for the suggestion that the prohibition does
exist in custom, see STORCHLER, supra note 3, at 92-126. It is also generally agreed in
the literature that the prohibition of the use of force is a jus cogens norms (a
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The prohibition of the threat of force has also been restated,
albeit in a soft law format, in subsequent international instruments,
such as the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States1 8 and
the 1987 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in
International Relations.1 9
However, neither of these soft law instruments goes beyond a
restatement of Article 2(4). The 1970 Declaration sets out that every
state "has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations." 20 It proceeds to confirm that "[s]uch
a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and
the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a
Similarly, the 1987
means of settling international issues."21
Declaration provides that "[e]very State has the duty to refrain in its
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." 22 At this juncture, it is enough to note that neither Article
2(4) of the UN Charter nor the declarations that reinforce the
prohibition give any obvious guidance as to when a threat of force is
unlawful or under what circumstances it would be permissible.2 3

peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is possible). See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2006)

("The prohibition of the use of force by States undoubtedly forms part of jus cogens.").
Some scholars have taken this further and argued that the prohibition of the threat of
force is similarly a jus cogens norm. See, e.g., STURCHLER, supra note 3, at 63 ("It
is ... safe to conclude that article 2(4) of the UN Charter is jus cogens as a whole,
without distinction to be made between the threat of force and the actual use of force.").
However, the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force is in fact
debatable, and the prohibition of the threat of force is certainly not peremptory. See
generally James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibitionof the
Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 215, (2011) (regarding the peremptory status of the
prohibition of the use of force); id. at 225-29 (specifically regarding the peremptory
status of the prohibition of the threat of force).
18.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly
Relations Declaration].
19.
Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22,
U.N. Doc. A/42/22/766 (Nov. 18, 1987) [hereinafter Use of Force Declaration].
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 18, at 122.
20.
21.
Id.
Use of Force Declaration, supra note 19, 1 1.
22.
See OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE
23.
USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2010) ("Neither the Charter,
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B. The Jurisprudenceof the ICJ and the "Coupling"of Use and Threat
It is therefore useful to turn to the jurisprudence of the ICJ for
guidance as to the nature and scope of threats of force. However, only
a few ICJ decisions even refer to threats of force, let alone discuss
them in detail or provide any substantial guidance in terms of
defining the lawfulness of a threat of force. Of the decisions that do
refer to threats of force, the Court's analysis is generally rather
superficial. As these decisions are well documented, our factual
discussion is kept to a minimum. This subpart, therefore, primarily
concentrates on distilling the ICJ's position in its 1996 advisory
opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,24
which is crucial for our subsequent analysis.
The first case to consider threats of force in international law,
though, was the Corfu Channel merits decision of 1949, which arose
from the destruction of two British destroyers by mines off the
Albanian coast. 25 In response to the United Kingdom's application to
the ICJ, Albania asserted that British warships in the Corfu Straits
had twice violated Albanian sovereignty in breach of international
law. 26 First, Albania alleged that the threatening nature of the
tactical "diamond formation" adopted by the British destroyers and
other supporting vessels, prior to the two destroyers striking
Albanian mines, was a breach of its sovereignty.2 7 With regard to
this claim, the ICJ took the view, in light of the circumstances, that
the British action was threatening but nonetheless lawful.2 8
The second incident alleged as a breach of sovereignty by
Albania was known as Operation Retail. This operation involved the
sweeping for and removal of mines in the Corfu Straits by the Royal
Navy following the initial sinking of the British destroyers. 29 The
ICJ viewed this incident "as the manifestation of a policy of
force . . . [that cannot] find a place in international law."30 However,
the Court went on to state that it did not see this action as "an
unnecessarily large display of force" and therefore did "not consider
that the action of the British Navy was a demonstration of force for
the purpose of exercising political pressure on Albania."Si As a result,
the Court found the minesweeping action to be an unlawful breach of

nor its travaux prdparatoires, nor the General Assembly resolutions to interpret the
principle of the non-use of force lay down any definition of 'threat."').
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
24.
I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 10 (Apr. 9).
25.
26.
Id. at 12.
27.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 30-31. For more on this finding, see infra Part IV.
28.
Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 13, 32.
29.
Id. at 35.
30.
Id.
31.
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Albanian sovereignty because it was a use of force.3 2 Rather
confusingly, though, the Court implied that this use of force was not
itself threatening, or, at least, that it was not intended to be
threatening.3 3 This aspect of the Corfu Channel judgment could be
interpreted as indicating that the prohibition of the use of force was
breached, but that the prohibition of the threat of force was not. Of
course, this interpretation is speculative because the Court did not
phrase its findings in these terms; indeed, it did not refer directly to
Article 2(4) or its prohibitions at all.
Part TV returns to the Corfu Channel decision, but for present
purposes, it is enough to note that the Court was not especially
explicit in its examination of threats of force. The judgment may
cause more confusion than clarity on the issue. Nonetheless, what is
clear is that the ICJ indicated-albeit rather equivocally-that not all
threatening behavior is necessarily a breach of Article 2(4). Corfu
Channel, therefore, underlines the difficulty of determining whether
any given action constitutes an unlawful threat of force, but it does
little to resolve that difficulty.
In Nicaragua v. United States, a 1986 case concerning support of
the Contra guerillas by the United States, the first reference to the
threat of force occurs in paragraph 195 of the judgment, where the
Court defined the concept of an "armed attack."34 According to the
Court, an "armed attack" does not include "assistance to rebels in the
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support."3 5
Instead, the Court deemed such "assistance" to be a "threat or use of
force, or . . . intervention in the internal or external affairs of other

States."36 It is unlikely that either the provision of weapons or other
forms of logistical support involve the actual use of force. For
example, if state A supplies machine guns to a paramilitary
organization for use against state B, there has been no use of force by
state A against state B, even indirectly. However, this action is
clearly a threat: supplying the paramilitary organization with
weaponry indirectly threatens state B. Therefore, this aspect of the
Nicaragua judgment does little more than indicate one possible
manifestation of an unlawful threat of force.
The Court's most important decision regarding the status of
threats in international law is the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion
of 1996, in which it considered whether the threat or use of nuclear

Id.
32.
33.
See id. (finding the British actions to be proportional reactions to "serious
outrages").
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
34.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 195 (June 27). The concept of an armed attack will be discussed
infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 1 195.
35.
Id.
36.
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weapons was "permitted" under international law.3 7 The ICJ
recognized that "states sometimes signal that they possess certain
weapons to use in self-defence against any state violating their
territorial integrity or political independence."3 8 One issue before the
Court, therefore, was whether such a "signalled intention" constituted
a threat within the ambit of Article 2(4):
Whether a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is or is
not a "threat" within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends
upon various factors. If the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the
stated readiness to use it would be a threat prohibited under Article 2,
paragraph 4 .... [equally] if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of
a State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the
39

Charter.

This statement clearly establishes that a threat to use force can
constitute a lawful action, and, moreover, that the lawfulness of any
threat of force is contingent upon the prospective lawfulness of the
force threatened. The Court's 1996 finding is the most authoritative
statement of this position, but it was far from novel. Indeed, the
Court briefly noted in the 1986 Nicaragua case that the threat of
force "is equally forbidden by the principle of non-use of force." 40
Although this statement seems somewhat nonsensical-it would
seem illogical for the prohibition of use to also prohibit threats
because use and threat are different things-it can reasonably be
interpreted to mean that the Court viewed the threat of force as being
"equally forbidden" by Article 2(4), or that the threat of force and the
use of force are "equally forbidden."
The conceptual "coupling" of the prohibitions of threat and use of
force, to the extent that lawful force can be lawfully threatened and
vice versa, has also long since been the majority position taken in the
(admittedly limited) academic commentary on threats in
international law. For example, in 1963, Jan Brownlie stated that
"[ijf the promise is to resort to force in conditions in which no
justification for the use of force exists, the threat is itself illegal."4 1
More recent literature reaffirms this position, 42 although some
scholars admittedly take an alternative view.43
Ultimately, despite the lack of clarity in the international
instruments prohibiting the threat of force and the ambiguity of state
practice on this issue, it seems evident, from both the Nuclear

37.
I.C.J. 226,
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
(2005).
43.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
1 (July 8).
Id. 1 47.
Id.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 227.
BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 364.
See, e.g., YoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 81
Sadurska, supra note 3, at 239, 250.
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Weapons opinion and the wider literature, that if actual force is
unlawful, then, retroactively, so is the threat to use that same force.44
Similarly, lawful force can be lawfully threatened. 45 Article 2(4) is a
binding normative provision prohibiting the threat or use of force,
and the only universally accepted means of lawfully justifying the use
of force are under Articles 42 and 51 of the Charter. 46 Thus, we argue
that the same proposition must apply for threats. All threats of force
are prima facie unlawful. 4 7 A threat is therefore permissible only if
the actual force threatened is permissible-meaning that it falls
under Article 42 or 51.48

C. Typology of Threats of Force
At this juncture, it is useful to briefly identify several categories
of threats that are apparent in state practice. Given that Article 2(4)
and other international instruments are essentially silent on the
issue and the ICJ has provided only minimal guidance, this subpart
provides a brief typology of actions that potentially violate the
prohibition of the threat of force.
The fact that Article 2(4) fails to define a threat of force has led
legal commentators to attempt to clarify the concept. Romana
Sadurska, for example, defined a threat of force as "a message,
explicit or implicit, formulated by a decision maker and directed to
the target audience, indicating that force will be used if a rule or
demand is not complied with."49 Brownlie similarly defined the
threat of force as "an express or implied promise by a government of a
resort to force conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands of
that government."5 0 This type of action represents the first possible
category of threat: the clear communication (oral or by
communiqu6) 51 that failure to comply with a request, obligation, or
ultimatum will result in force being employed. 52 For example, state A
threatens state B with force unless it complies with state A's
This is the most intuitively representative and
demands.
recognizable understanding of a threat of force, and it is the "type" of

44.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 39.
45.
See Sadurska, supra note 3, at 250-51 ("[Ilnternational actors demonstrate
varying degrees of approval or more or less reluctant tolerance for unilateral threats.").
46.
Waters & Green, supra note 8, at 294-98.
47.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
48.
Waters & Green, supra note 8, at 294-98.
49.
Sadurska, supra note 3, at 242.
BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 364.
50.
As Lauren confirms, "a communication need not be restricted to a
51.
requirement that it be written." Lauren, supra note 15, at 136. He also notes that in
practice, ultimata have occasionally "been issued orally or, to use the French phrase, in
the form of a 'note verbale."' Id. at 137.
52.
Myers, supra note 3, at 143.
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threat that international law academics most commonly reference. 53
There is little doubt that such threats violate Article 2(4), at least
prima facie. 54
Second, a threat may be apparent if a state enters into a
defensive treaty alliance, such as the Warsaw Pact.5 5 A more
contemporary example is the Russian Federation's position
concerning Georgian and Ukrainian accession to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. 56 In context, these defensive pacts are selfevidently "threatening," but this practice seems not to fall within the
concept of an unlawful threat,'5 7 because defensive pacts have long
been widely accepted in state practice. This acceptance may, of
course, be based on the fact that these agreements are threats of force
However, as
made in self-defense, as this Article discusses.
Randelzhofer cautions, a treaty may have both offensive and
defensive purposes, and it may be difficult to distinguish between the
two.58 Therefore, it is perhaps better to view these defensive pacts as
not breaching Article 2(4) at all.
A third possible category is essentially implicit in nature, but it
is perhaps more important in practice than verbal communication.
Certain positive actions (such as a state increasing its military
budget or undertaking military maneuvers) may be intended or
perceived as a threat of force. Lauren, for example, explains that
"[n]aval demonstrations ... often afford evidence of threats involving
an exemplary show of force as punishment for noncompliance with
ultimata demands."5 9 Similarly, as Harris notes, Iraq's 1994 buildup

53.
As Corten points out, this type of explicit ultimatum is the "definition of
threat that is often cited." CORTEN, supra note 23, at 103; see, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra
note 7, at 364; Myers, supra note 3, at 143.
54.
CORTEN, supra note 23, at 106.
Sadurska, supra note 3, at 243.
55.
In 2008, the Russian Federation made clear that it saw the potential NATO
56.
membership of Georgia and Ukraine as a threat to its security and the security of
Europe in general. See, e.g., Medvedev Warns on NATO Expansion, BBC NEWS (March
25, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7312045.stm.
See Sadurska, supra note 3, at 243-44 (including defensive pacts among
57.
possible types of threats, but concluding that "[o]nly communications that ... trigger a
reaction of stress that leads to accommodating or adapting behavior" constitute
threats).
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
58.
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 112, 124 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
Lauren, supra note 15, at 149. Lauren's example is that in the years
59.
preceding the Young Turk Revolution, Great Britain frequently coerced the Ottoman
Empire with displays of force. Id.
Charging that it was "trifling with his Majesty's Government," Great Britain
issued an ultimatum to the Empire in 1906. The demands included the
evacuation of Taba by Turkish troops and the acceptance of the Sinai boundary
with Egypt within a time limit of ten days. The threat for noncompliance was
"the immediate dispatch of a British ship of war" to the locality in question.
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of troops along the border of Kuwait was viewed by the United
Kingdom as a breach of the prohibition of the threat of force. 60
It is therefore clear that troop buildups and other forms of
military posturing can constitute an unlawful threat of force.
Equally, it seems that not all such actions are necessarily unlawful.
For example, the extensive report produced by the Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
(IIFFMCG),61 which was established by the Council of the European
Union to investigate the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, 62 took the
view that, "[a]ccording to State practice[,] . . . not all militarised acts

amount to a demonstration of force and thus to a violation of Art. 2(4)
of the UN Charter. Many are routine missions devoid of any hostile
intent and are meaningless in the absence of a sizable dispute."63
Similarly, it has been noted that "[s]ecret military exercises or
maneuvers might amount to the preparation of aggression but are not
threats under the terms of Article 2(4) if they are unknown to the
In other words, it may be that even deliberately
victim." 64
threatening military behavior should only be labeled as an unlawful
threat if it can be (or is) perceived as a threat. 65
In the context of these implicit threats, it is possible to
distinguish technical threats of force from planning and
preparation. 66 In certain situations, the threat of force can form part
of the preparations for using force. 67 Roscini cites the Japanese
threats against French Indo-China from 1940 to 1941 to illustrate
this distinction. 68 These threats were carried out in order to secure a
staging point for attacks against the Philippines, Malaya, and the
Netherlands East Indies. 69 He takes the view that the difference
between threats and preparations for war is that "[w]hile in the latter
the decision to use force has already been taken, threats are not
intended as preparatory acts in view of subsequently using force, but

Id.
60.
ed. 2010).
61.

DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 725 (7th
1-3 INDEP. INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN

GEOR., REPORT (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html.
Council Decision 2008/901, Concerning an Independent International Fact62.
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2008 O.J. (L 323) 66.
2 IIFFMCG, supra note 61, at 232.
63.
Roscini, supranote 3, at 237-38.
64.
65.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 541 (July 8) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) ("[A) secretly harboured
intention to commit a wrongful or criminal act does not attract legal consequences,
unless and until that intention is followed through by corresponding conduct.").
Roscini, supra note 3, at 230.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.

298

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44.-285

as a coercive means alternative to it."70 It is unclear what legal
consequences flow from this distinction, and legally whether "pure
threats" should be treated any differently from "preparatory threats."
In any event, this distinction is useful for understanding the typology
of military threats.
Again, although it is clear that international law prohibits the
threat of force, it is less clear what in fact constitutes a threat of force
(in the technical legal sense) in violation of Article 2(4). There are a
variety of types of action that may be viewed as threats of force, but
the extent to which these types of action are prima facie unlawful is
not altogether evident. Nonetheless, the above typology is important
to keep in mind during the subsequent analysis.
III. SELF-DEFENSE INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE

This Part turns from the concept of the threat of force to examine
the right of self-defense, as it is commonly understood in
international law, and the criteria that regulate its exercise. The
right of self-defense under international law is relatively well-trodden
ground. As such, this Part is deliberately brief and aims simply to
provide the criteria that underpin our later discussion of threats
made in self-defense. First, the rules governing self-defense are set
out with regard to the relatively uncontroversial situation of force in
response to a prior use of force. Second, this Part touches upon the
contentious notion of using force in response to a prior threat (actions
that may be termed "anticipatory" and "preemptive" self-defense).
A. "Traditional"Self-Defense: The Use of Force in
Response to the Use of Force
Self-defense taken in response to a prior use of military force is
universally accepted as an exception to the prohibition of the use of
force, assuming that such action meets certain criteria.7 ' These
criteria stem from both conventional and customary international
law 72 and are well known. Admittedly, their exact scope and

Id.
70.
As is stated in the commentary produced by the International Law
71.
Commission (ILC) concerning its Articles on State Responsibility: "The existence of a
general principle admitting self-defense as an exception to the prohibition against the
use of force in international relations is undisputed." Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d
Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 177; GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (emphasis added).
72.
The ICJ reaffirmed this in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1134 (June 27).
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application have been-and continue to be-extensively debated.7 3 It
is not the purpose of this Article to revisit these debates or to go into
detail with regard to self-defense generally. Nonetheless, it is
necessary to briefly set out the primary criteria that are applied to
assess the lawfulness of forcible actions avowedly taken in selfdefense.
To understand self-defense today, it first must be noted that the
rules deriving from the two key sources of international lawconvention and custom--do not necessarily correspond. 74 As such,
the modern international legal regime concerning self-defense is an
amalgamation of the pre-1945 customary international law and
Article 51 of the UN Charter.7 5 Taken together, these sources of law
provide the three primary criteria against which self-defense claims
must be tested.76
Looking first at treaty law, the core provision regarding selfdefense is found in Article 51 of the UN Charter: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations."77 Article 51 therefore indicates that self-defense
is only lawful "if an armed attack occurs."7 8 As such, a state acting in
self-defense must have suffered (or, arguably, must be faced with the
imminent threat of suffering7 9 ) an armed attack against it.80

73.

For

a

useful

summary

of these

debates,

see

CHRISTINE

GRAY,

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 128-60 (3d ed. 2008).

74.

Something the ICJ also pointed out in Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J.

175.

JAMES A. GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SELF75.
DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-38 (2009).

James A. Green, Fluctuating Evidentiary Standards for Self-Defence in the
76.
InternationalCourt of Justice, 58 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 163, 178 (2008).
77.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
78.

Id.

79.
See infra Part III.B.
It should be noted that in addition to the criterion of an armed attack,
80.
Article 51 sets out two other criteria for the exercise of self-defense. The first of these is
that measures taken in self-defense must be reported to the Security Council. U.N.
Charter art. 51. This criterion is essentially procedural, and is not determinative as to
lawfulness. As such, it will not be further discussed with regard to self-defense by
threat. Second, Article 51 holds that the right of self-defense is terminated once "the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." Id. In other words, any action. of self-defense must end once the Security
Council has taken measures to alleviate the defensive necessity. Leaving aside the
debate as to whether such measures must be "effective" or not, it would logically hold
that this aspect of Article 51 would apply equally to responses involving either the
threat or use of force. It therefore needs to be discussed no further here. For a
discussion of both of these additional criteria in Article 51, see Don W. Greig, SelfDefence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?, 40 INT'L & COMP L.Q.
366, 366 (1991).

300

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:285

Since the adoption of the UN Charter, the term "armed attack"
has been interpreted to mean a qualitatively grave use of force. 81 As
the ICJ has held, an armed attack constitutes "the most grave form of
the use of force,"8 2 in contrast with "less grave forms," which do not
trigger the right.83 Therefore, it is not enough for a state to suffer a
use of force against it: the responding state must face an attack of a
"grave" level, beyond that of a use of force simpliciter.
Turning to the customary roots of self-defense, the crucial
element of the pre-Charter regime was that for a response to be
lawful, it must have been both necessary and proportional. These two
criteria stretch well back into international legal theory. 84 However,
they appeared on the landscape of modern international law with a
much-quoted 1841 letter by Daniel Webster, the then-U.S. Secretary
of State, concerning the 1837 sinking of the steamship Caroline.8 5
Webster insisted that a state claiming self-defense must:
[S]how a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to
show, also, that ... [it] did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the
act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that
86
necessity, and kept clearly within it.

The concepts of necessity and proportionality are clearly discernable
from this famous statement. Since the time of the Caroline, these
criteria have developed legal content through cumulative state
87
practice and opiniojuris.
Today, the necessity criterion requires that the responding state
show that it exhausted non-forcible measures or that the extremity of
the situation meant that it would have been wholly unreasonable to
expect the responding state to attempt non-forcible measures of
AvRA CONSTANTINOU, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER CUSTOMARY
81.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 57 (2000). An assessment of
state practice concerning self-defense supports this position as to the nature of armed
attack. See GREEN, supra note 75, 112-29.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
82.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 191 (June 27). This statement was also reemployed in the Oil
Platforms decision. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 51 (Nov. 6).
Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. 1 191.
83.
For example, Vattel discussed the notion of "necessity" and the exhaustion
84.
of peaceful measures before resorting to war in the eighteenth century. 3 EMERICH DE
VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Lol NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA
CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS 305 (James B. Scott ed.,
Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (1758).
Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry S. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH
85.
AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS (1841-42), 1129-39 (1857) [hereinafter Webster Letter].
86.
Id. at 1137-38.
For a detailed examination of the developmental process of these criteria
87.
from their appearance in Webster's letter to elements of customary international law,
see generally James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understandingthe Relevance of
the Formula in Contemporary Customary InternationalLaw Concerning Self-Defense,
14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 429 (2006).
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resolution.88 In other words, a forcible response must be a last resort
with no practical or reasonable alternative.
The criterion of proportionality requires the state to act in a
89
manner that is proportional to the established defensive necessity.
This means that the proportionality criterion does not merely require
a numerical equivalence of scale or means, but rather that the force
employed must not be excessive with regard to the goal of abating or
repelling the attack.9 0
As a further aspect of both the necessity and proportionality
requirements, self-defense is lawful only until the attack being
Force used in self-defense is only
responded to has ended. 9 '
necessary until the attack (or the injurious consequences of it, such as
the occupation of territory) has abated. This is fairly straightforward:
it cannot be necessary to continue to respond in self-defense once
there is no longer a situation creating a defensive necessity.
Similarly, given that proportionality requires a balance between the
force used in response to an attack and the need to abate that attack,
it is logical that once the attack is abated, further forcible action is
disproportional.
Both necessity and proportionality are flexible and contextspecific criteria that are based, to an extent, on notions of
Despite this degree of
acceptability and reasonableness.9 2
indeterminacy and the fact that Article 51 mentions neither necessity
nor proportionality, it is uncontroversial that these criteria survived
the inception of the United Nations and persist as criteria governing
93
the lawful exercise of self-defense.

This interpretation of the necessity criterion may be discerned from state
88.
practice. See id. at 450-57 (using historical examples to frame the necessity criterion).
See, e.g., JUDITH G. GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE
89.
OF FORCE BY STATES 142 (2004); Ruth Wedgwood, Proportionality and Necessity in
American National Security Decision Making, 86 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 58, 59 (1992).
See sources cited supra note 89.
90.
CONSTANTINOU, supra note 81, 159-61; Gamal M. Badr, The Exculpatory
91.
Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 25-26 (1980);
David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra JudicialExecutions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 187-88 (2005).
On the flexibility of these criteria, see GARDAM, supra note 89, at 20-22;
92.
DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER, 64 (1975) (discussing
the criteria in the context of naval warfare); Richard R. Baxter, The Legal
Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force Under the Charter, 62 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 68, 74 (1968) (discussing the difficulty of defining proportionality).
See, e.g., GARDAM, supra note 89, at 6, 11 ("[T]here has been consistent
93.
agreement ever since the adoption of the United Nations Charter on the need for any
forceful action, irrespective of legal basis, to be proportionate."); GRAY, supra note 73,
at 148-49 (noting that the parties in Nicaragua "agreed that any exercise of selfdefence must be necessary and proportionate"); Oscar Schachter, Implementing
Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity:
Remarks, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39 (1992) (stating that proportionality and
necessity are an undisputed part of the analysis).
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As such, when the treaty-based requirement of an armed attack
is coupled with the continuing customary international law criteria
expressed in the Caroline exchange, self-defense is governed by three
primary criteria:
(1)

Armed attack: did the responding state suffer a grave use of
force against it?

(2)

Necessity: did that grave use of force create a defensive
necessity to which force was the only reasonable response of
last resort?

(3)

Proportionality: was the force used the minimum required
to meet the defensive necessity created by the attack?

If all three questions can be answered in the affirmative, then,
broadly speaking, a use of force in response to a prior use of force will
amount to a lawful self-defense. 94

B. Anticipatory and Preemptive Self-Defense: The Use of
Force in Response to the Threat of Force
This Article does not attempt to examine the deep divisions that
exist among both states and scholars over the lawfulness of a forcible
response in self-defense against a threat rather than an actual use of
force.95 Whether an actual attack must have "occurred," as Article 51
indicates,9 6 or whether the preexisting manifestation of the rightallowing for force to be used against a threat 9 7-has survived the
adoption of the UN Charter, goes beyond the scope of this Article. As
such, we follow the ICJ's policy of abstaining from taking a position
on the lawfulness of self-defense in response to a threat.9 8 However,
to support our analysis of countervailing threats, it is necessary to
briefly touch upon the question.
It is worth noting that the terminology used to describe this
possible manifestation of self-defense varies across the literature;
different scholars use different terms to mean different things.9 9

But see supra note 80 (noting two other criteria in relation to self-defense).
94.
See supra note 2.
95.
U.N. Charter art. 51 (permitting the use of force in self-defense "if an
96.
armed attack occurs").
Under the Caroline formula, and therefore traditional customary
97.
international law rules governing self-defense, the anticipatory use of force in response
to an imminent threat was clearly permissible. For discussion, see Green, supra note
87, at 463-73.
In Nicaragua,for example, the Court stated that it "expresses no view on
98.
the issue" of self-defense in response to a threat. Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 194 (June 27). This
statement was referred to, and the same stance was taken, in Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),2005 I.C.J. 116, 1 143 (Feb. 3).
GRAY, supranote 73, at 211-12.
99.
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Therefore, this Article uses the following terminology: "anticipatory
self-defense" refers to action taken in response to an imminent threat,
while "preemptive self-defense" refers to action taken in response to a
perceived threat that is more temporally remote.100
Although the ICJ has not endorsed the use of force in the context
of anticipatory defensive action, 0 1 the Court has nonetheless
appeared to take the view, as can be seen from paragraph 35 of
Nicaragua,that an "armed attack" would be the relevant standard if
such action were lawful:
[I]n the circumstances of the dispute now before the Court, what is in
issue is the purported exercise by the United States of a right of
collective self-defense in response to an armed attack on another State.
The possible lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of an
10 2
armed attack which has not yet taken place has not been raised.

This statement implies that if anticipatory action is lawful, it is
lawful only in the case of a threatened armed attack, and Gill states
that "[t]here can be no doubt that an armed attack, or at any rate the
threat of an imminent armed attack is an absolute precondition for
the exercise of the right of self-defense." 0 3
Assuming, then, that anticipatory self-defense can be lawful at
all, it must be taken in response to a threatened armed attack, rather
than any threat of force whatsoever. In addition, it seems apparent
that when self-defense in response to a threat has been advanced as a
justification by states post-1945-which, admittedly, has not
happened often' 04-other states have tended to accept or reject the
claim based on whether the perceived threat was imminent.105 This

This particular terminological distinction is employed by Constantine
100.
Antonopoulos, Force by Armed Groups as Armed Attack and the Broadening of SelfDefence, 55 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 159, 172 (2008); and Niaz A. Shah, Self-Defence,
Anticipatory Self-Defence and Pre-Emption:InternationalLaw's Response to Terrorism,
12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 95, 111 (2007).
101.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
35 (emphasis added); see also id. T 194 (quoting
102.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.
drafting history as including the "armed" language).
Terry D. Gill, The Law of Armed Attack in the Context of the Nicaragua
103.
Case, 1 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 30, 35 (1988) (emphasis added).
Indeed, some of the incidents often cited as examples of anticipatory self104.
defense were not justified as anticipatory measures by the involved states. See GRAY,
supra note 73, at 112-15 (discussing the rarity of invocations of anticipatory selfdefense by states who appear to have taken preemptive action).
The best example of this followed the 1981 Israeli attack upon the Iraqi
105.
Osiraq nuclear reactor, after which Israel explicitly justified its action as anticipatory
self-defense. See U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. IT 79-84, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288
(June 19, 1981) ("Israel had full legal justification to exercise its inherent right of selfdefense . . . ."); GRAY, supra note 73, at 115. In doing so, Israel itself argued that the
danger posed by the Iraqi reactor was imminent. See U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th
mtg. 1 102, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 12, 1981) ("We [Israel] waited until the eleventh
hour after the diplomatic clock had run out. . . ."). States almost universally condemned
the action, but, notably, most states did so on the basis that the threat to Israel was,
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idea, termed in this Article as "anticipatory self-defense," conforms to
the Caroline formula, which held that to respond to a threat, the
threat must be "instant .. . leaving no moment for deliberation." 106
Although forcible self-defense in response to a threat is far from
universally accepted as lawful, those that support the doctrine
generally employ the concept of imminence as a vital part of any
attempt to establish the lawfulness of such action.10 7 This conclusion,
that imminence is required before self-defense in response to a threat
can even be considered lawful, is supported by the international
reaction to the "Bush Doctrine," first advanced by the United States
in 2002.108 In its National Security Strategy of that year, the United
States stated that it would resort to the preemptive use of force "even
if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's
attack." 0 9 In other words, it argued for the lawfulness of self-defense
in response to a non-imminent threat. We term this type of action
"preemptive self-defense." It is uncontroversial that this "doctrine" of
preemptive self-defense has not met with general acceptance, either
from states"o or scholars."'

contrary to what Israel had claimed, not imminent. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess.,
2288th mtg. T 28-30, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288, (June 19, 1981) (noting that while Israel
may have legitimately felt threatened, there were still non-military solutions
available); U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2284th mtg. TT 44-47, 11 U.N. Doc S/PV.2284 (June
16, 1981) ("Today the Israelis attack Baghdad for having a nuclear reactor centre that
was described by the ... IAEA . .. as 'peaceful nuclear facilities."'); U.N. SCOR, 36th
Sess., 2283d mtg. T 53-56, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2283 (June 15, 1981) (referring to the air
raid on Iraq's capital as an "unprovoked" act of terrorism). Of course, a number of other
states argued that the action was unlawful because self-defense against a threat is
unlawful per se; for example, the Soviet Union referred to such actions as "the law of
the jungle." Id.
63.
106.
Webster Letter, supra note 85, at 1138.
107.
For example, while Gazzini does not conclude upon the lawfulness of
anticipatory self-defense one way or another, he does hold that such action may be
lawful once the point is reached where there is a "concrete and immediate threat."
TARCIsIo GAzzINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
174 (2005).
108.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(2002), http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/policy/nationallnss-020920.pdf.
109.
Id. at 115. This position was restated, essentially unmodified in 2005 and
2006. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 18,

U.S. DEP'T OF
23 (2006), http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf;
DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9-12
(2005), http://www.defenselink.millnews/Apr2005/d2OO5O4O8strategy.pdf.
110.
See, for example, the categorical rejection of the notion of preemptive
attack by the Non-Aligned Movement in the declaration that emerged from the
Fourteenth Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Non-Aligned Movement, FinalRep. Covering the 14th Conference of Heads of States or
22.5 (July 30, 2008), available at
Governments of the Non-Aligned Movement,
http://www.cubanoal.culingles/index.
111.
See, e.g., GAZZINI, supra note 107, at 238 ("State practice is neither
quantitatively nor qualitatitvely consistent enough to affirm the existence of a right to
anticipatory self-defence, a development that would stretch beyond recognition the
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Therefore, it seems that forcible self-defense in response to a
threat of force is controversial but arguably lawful. However, even
those who accept the lawfulness of forcible self-defense in response to
a threat generally require that the threat be grave (a threatened
armed attack) and imminent. 112 These requirements are additional
to the requirements that the response be necessary and proportional,
as with a response taken to a prior use of force.1 13

IV. Is NON-FORCIBLE SELF-DEFENSE CONCEPTUALLY POSSIBLE?
Having set out-so far as is possible-the international law
governing the threat of force and outlined the criteria for "traditional"
forcible self-defense, this Part turns to the central question of
whether an otherwise unlawful threat of force is lawful if taken as a
defensive response to the prior action of another state.
The first issue is whether "non-forcible" self-defense by way of
the threat of force is conceptually possible as an aspect of current
international law. Of the few scholars who have indicated that selfdefense may be manifested by way of a threat, most view this
conclusion as self-evident under the existing law. For example,
Sttirchler states that such a reading of Articles 2(4) and 51 is a
"traditional" approach.11 4 It is difficult to support Stfilrchler's claim
here because no other scholars have tackled the issue in any detail.
We too take the view that the notion of threats in self-defense is
However, this
conceptually acceptable (and even desirable).
conclusion is certainly not self-evident.
Indeed, the concept of non-forcible self-defense by way of a threat
is initially counterintuitive. The literature governing the inherent
right of self-defense-and the criteria that have developed over
hundreds of years of treaty and customary international law
evolution to regulate that right-points towards the view that selfdefense is an inherently "forcible" exercise. 115

notion of self-defence itself."); Greenwood, supra note 2, at 12-16 ("[The right of
anticipatory self-defense is confined to instances where the armed attack is
imminent."); Sapiro, supra note 2, at 599-603 ("Although the law can be interpreted to
permit defensive action in the face of an imminent threat, it is difficult-and
dangerous-to stretch it farther.").
See Shah, supra note 100, at 101-04, 111-19 (describing the gravity and
112.
immediacy of the threat required to justify self-defense under international law).
Dominika Svarc, Anticipatory and Preventative Force Under International
113.
Law, 19 PEACE REV.: J. SOC. JUST. 217, 219 (2007).
STORCHLER, supra note 3, at 219. Stuirchler offers nothing in support of this
114.
claim. See also Myers, supra note 3, at 135 (stating that threats may be used as a form
of self-defense).
115 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 7, 254 (referring to self-defense as being
"exercisable through the medium of armed force"); DINSTEIN, supra note 42, 176
(defining self-defense as "a permissible form of armed self-help"); MYRA WILLIAMSON,
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As a rule, states do not claim that they are responding in selfdefense by way of a threat; instead, they threaten to respond in selfdefense by way of force. In other words, state A may articulate to
state B that if state B attacks, state A will respond in self-defense
(meaning with force), but state A will not claim that the threat itself
is self-defense. This response suggests that state A does not perceive
its threat as an action of self-defense. 116 Similarly, the general (and
largely unquestioned) academic position is that self-defense must, by
its very nature, be forcible.1 17
Nonetheless, occasionally throughout the UN era, scholars have
invoked a notion of "non-forcible self-defense." For example, in 1958,
Derek Bowett argued that the right of self-defense can be activated if
a state suffers "economic aggression" that does not constitute an
actual use of force.11 8 Bowett proceeded to argue that, in the majority
of such instances, any response taken in self-defense must itself be
non-forcible to meet the requirements of necessity and
proportionality.'19 Therefore, he conceptually accepted the notion of
non-forcible self-defense. Specifically, Bowett envisaged a response
consisting of some form of otherwise unlawful economic coercion: "For
example, a state may on grounds of self-defense justify discrimination
against products of another state despite a duty of non-discrimination
assumed towards that state under treaty."' 2 0
It is unlikely that the right of self-defense can be stretched to
cover economic measures in this way, because the right of self-defense
provides an exception to the prohibition found in Article 2(4),121 and
it is clear that Article 2(4) does not regulate economic coercion.122 It

TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE
AGAINST AFGHANISTAN IN 2001, 108 (2009) ("[Elven if the Charter had preserved a

right of customary self-defence, the customary right would probably only have entitled
states to use force in response to an armed attack from another state . . . ."); and Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 32d Sess., May 5--July 25, 1980, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc.
A/35/10, at 54 ("[S]elf-defense almost by its very nature involves the use of armed
force.").
116. For example, take Iran's 2007 statement that if the United States launched
airstrikes against it, Iran would respond in self-defense. Iran to Use "All Means" to
Defend Itself if Attacked, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSBLA93839720070919
117.
See sources cited supra note 115.
DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 110-11 (1958).
118.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 111.
121.
As noted, for example, in WILLIAMSON, supra note 115, at 105 (stating that
Article 51 provides an "exemption to the general prohibition on the use of force").
122.
See, e.g., STORCHLER, supra note 3, at 23 (noting that a proposal to include
economic coercion in Article 2(4) was rejected); Eduardo J. de Arechega, International
Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 140 (1978) (stating that
no principle of international law prohibits a state from breaking off diplomatic or
economic relations with another); Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in
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would be nonsensical for a particular manifestation of a type of
conduct to constitute an exception to a rule that does not prohibit that
type of conduct in the first instance. Therefore, if economic measures
in response to prior wrongs are to be seen as lawful, it is more logical
to classify such actions as non-forcible
countermeasures.
However, this conclusion does not extend to threats of force
because Article 2(4) explicitly prohibits the threat of force. 123 As
such, Article 2(4) is not a conceptual bar to a notion of self-defense by
way of the threat of force.
Self-defense is an exception to the
prohibition contained in Article 2(4),124 and the threat of force is
covered by that prohibition.1 25 Similarly, nothing in Article 51 of the
UN Charter requires that measures taken on its authority be forcible;
it simply holds that the right of self-defense is to be unimpaired by
the UN Charter.126
Moreover, since Bowett wrote in the 1950s, it is notable that
some writers have explicitly accepted the concept of a threat of force
in self-defense.1 27 Admittedly, relatively few scholars have taken this
stance, but the concept is evident in the literature.128 Roscini states
that "the warning of a forcible defensive reaction by the victim of an
armed attack would not breach Article 2(4)."129 Dinstein similarly
underlines that "if a State declares its readiness to use force in
conformity with Charter, this is not an illegal 'threat' but a legitimate
warning and reminder."'so
This concept was also explicitly noted and endorsed by the
independent fact-finding mission set up by the European Union to
investigate the conflict in the Caucasus in 2008 (IIFFMCG).13 1 The
mission's report concluded that "[iln principle, threats can be justified
either as a measure of self-defense or when authorized by the UN

ContemporaryInternational Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 408-13 (1985) (arguing that
economic coercion is outside the scope of Article 2(4)).
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
123.
124.
WILLIAMSON, supranote 115, at 105.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
125.
Id. art. 51. Moreover, if one examines the debates at the 1945 San
126.
Francisco conference on the drafting of the UN Charter, there is nothing to indicate
that self-defense was necessarily limited to a forcible response. In a typical example,
the delegate of the United States, Senator Vandenberg, stated that his state recognized
"the inherent right of self-defense, whether individual or collective, which permits any
sovereign state among us ... to ward off attack" with no mention of how a state was to
ward off such an attack. See 11 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, U.N. Doc. 972, 111/6, 53 (1945). Of course, the failure of
states at the San Francisco conference to insist that self-defense be taken as a forcible
response could also be the result of an assumption on the part of these states that selfdefense is self-evidently a forcible exercise.
127.
See supra note 3.
128.
See supra note 3.
129.
Roscini, supranote 3, at 237.
130.
DINSTEIN, supra note 42, at 81.
131.
2 IIFFMCG, supra note 61, at 236.
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Security Council." 132 On the facts, IIFFMCG found that neither the
threats made by Russia nor those made by Georgia prior to the
conflict could be lawfully justified as self-defense.13 3 Nonetheless, by
considering the issue at all, the IIFFMCG clearly indicated the
conceptual possibility of threats as lawful self-defense.
Returning to the jurisprudence of the ICJ, in more than one
decision, the Court has accepted-at least implicitly-the possibility
of self-defense manifested by a threat of force. This apparent
acceptance can be traced back to the Court's discussion, in Corfu
Channel, of the Albanian claim that the passage of the British
warships on October 22, 1946, was not "innocent." 134 Although the
Court did not find, on the evidence, that the British vessels were in a
"combat formation,"13 5 it did take note of the fact that the warships
were "at action stations" very close to the Albanian coast. 136 The
Court went on to say that "[t]he intention [of the United Kingdom]
must have been, not only to test Albania's attitude, but at the same
time to demonstrate such force that she [Albania] would abstain from
firing again on passing ships."'37 The ICJ seemingly saw the threats
by the British as actions of the sort that would generally be viewed as
being unlawful; however, in view of an earlier firing from an Albanian
battery, the Court concluded that it could not "characterize these
measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a violation of
Albania's sovereignty."13 8 In other words, the Court appeared to take
the view that the United Kingdom's otherwise-unlawful threat of
force should be considered lawful because of the preceding use of force
by Albania.
More recently, in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion of 1996,
the ICJ held, as previously discussed,' 3 9 that not all threats of force
amount to breaches of Article 2(4) per se. 140 The Court made clear
that if the use of the threatened force would be lawful, then the
threat to use that force is likewise a lawful threat of force. 14 1 Indeed,
the Court specifically linked this relationship between use and threat

132.
Id. (citation omitted).
133.
Id. at 237-38. The IIFFMCG also pointed out the rather self-evident fact
that no authorization had come from the Security Council either. Id. at 236.
134.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 12 (Apr. 9); see supra Part I.B.
For further discussion of this case, see also supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
135.
Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 30-31.
136.
Id. at 31.
137.
Id. (emphasis added).
138.
Id.
139.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
140.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 47 (July 8) (discussing situations where threats of force would be
lawful).
141.
Id.
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to the right of self-defense. 14 2 Like Corfu Channel, then, the Nuclear
Weapons opinion indicates that a threat can be a lawful action if it is
taken for a defensive purpose.
In the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion of 2004 (Wall
opinion), the construction of a separation barrier by Israel constituted
a non-forcible action, which the ICJ held to be unlawful.143 Israel
argued, inter alia, that the construction of the wall constituted an
action taken in self-defense.1 44 The ICJ rejected this claim, not on
the basis that non-forcible measures inherently fall outside of the
scope of self-defense,1 45 but rather because the threat perceived by
Israel emanated from within its territory and not from an external
state.146

By not dismissing the claim that the construction of the wall
could constitute self-defense on the simple basis that it was a nonforcible measure, the Court may again have indicated that an action
taken in self-defense need not necessarily involve the use of military
force. Whether the construction of such a barrier could be considered
a threat of force under Article 2(4) is debatable.14 7 In any event, the
Wall opinion offers additional support for the general viability of nonforcible self-defense.14 8
Based upon these decisions, it is evident that the Court has
viewed the threat of force, irrespective of its status as a prima facie
breach of Article 2(4), as lawful in certain circumstances. Moreover,
these circumstances appear to include the threat of force as a
defensive measure. The Court's implicit acceptance of non-forcible
self-defense was criticized by Judge Higgins in her separate opinion
to the Wall opinion: "I remain unconvinced that non-forcible
measures (such as the building of a wall) fall within self-defense
under Article 51 of the Charter as that provision is normally
understood."149
Although Judge Higgins was patently correct that the normal
understanding of Article 51 is that action taken in self-defense will be
142.
See id. (noting that states make known their ability to deploy certain
weapons as a deterrence method of self-defense).
143.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 135, 142 (July 9).
144.
A claim explicitly made to the UN General Assembly. U.N. GAOR,
Emergency Special Sess., 21st mtg. at 6, UN Doc. A/ES-10/PV.21 (Oct. 20, 2003).
Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 11 138-39.
145.
Id.
146.
We would argue that the construction of a separation barrier does not
147.
constitute a breach of the prohibition of the threat of force because such a barrier could
not manifest as a use of force in itself, unlike, say, the deployment of a nuclear weapon,
which could clearly be seen as a threat of force.
This is what Judge Higgins inferred from this aspect of the judgment. Wall,
148.
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 1 35 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.).
149.
Id.
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inherently forcible,15 0 she did not elucidate what makes this normal
understanding a desirable one, and she did not indicate any reason
why non-forcible self-defense is legally incoherent. As previously
noted, one possible problem in this context is that Article 2(4) does
not prohibit certain non-forcible actions (such as economic coercion or,
perhaps, the building of a wall), and therefore such actions cannot
comfortably fall within the scope of one of the exceptions to that
article. As noted, though, this is not the case with regard to the
specific non-forcible measure that is the threat of force, because this
is itself prohibited by Article 2(4). Therefore, this Article argues that
there is nothing to prevent a conception of lawful self-defense by way
of a threat.
V. IS THE THREAT OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE DESIRABLE?

Although there is no legal reason to reject the notion of nonforcible self-defense by threat, it is questionable whether, from a
policy perspective, it is desirable for the law to allow for
The inherent difficulty of determining
countervailing threats.
whether a "threat of force" within the meaning of Article 2(4) has
occurred at all, 15 1 coupled with the existing flexibility of the rules
governing traditional self-defense,1 52 may suggest that including
threats of force within the inherent right is undesirable. It has been
argued, on this basis, that "the justification of self-defense would lend
itself even more easily to abuse for the threat of force than for the
actual use of force." 5 3
In itself, this problem is undeniable: self-defense would offer
states a clear legal basis for threatening force, and this basis would
be open to abuse. However, it is a truism that states threaten force
all the time.154 The fact that the limits on when threats may be
permissible are blurred (and largely unexplored in the literature) is
all the more reason to set out a clear framework to determine
whether a threat of force is a lawful self-defense measure. At the
very least, under a more explicit framework, threats that obviously
fall outside of a defensive scope can be convincingly labeled as
unlawful.15 5 Moreover, it is nonsensical to allow for the lawful use of

150.
See, e.g., sources cited note 115.
151.
See BARKER, supra note 3, at 129 (discussing the controversy surrounding
the interpretation of "force" in Article 2(4)); see generally supra Part II.
See supra text accompanying note 92.
152.
STORCHLER, supra note 3, at 42.
153.

154.

Thus, "threats of force are a ubiquitous element of international relations."

Sadurska, supra note 3, at 239-40.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain from the threat
155.
or use of force . . . .").
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force in certain circumstances, where the criteria for self-defense are
met, but to absolutely prohibit the threat of force in the same
circumstances.
Given that both Article 2(4) and the ICJ's
interpretation of it indicate that the use and threat of force are
conceptually equal, 156 it must be the case that both actions are
equally lawful in the correct circumstances.
Although the threat and the use of force are conceptually the
same in international law, this Article has already argued that they
are very distinct in practice.157 The use of force concerns actual
manifest violence (potentially on a large scale), while the threat of
force does not.15 8 It therefore seems-taking the policy stance of
seeking to minimize the use of military force wherever possible-that
in most instances it will be desirable that states respond in selfdefense through non-forcible means rather than with actual
violence.1 59 Indeed, the desirability of this solution appears selfevident.
Threats in self-defense not only offer a clear alternative to the
actual use of force, they also offer a potentially more effective
alternative to other non-forcible countermeasures, because they
indicate that an actual use of force may follow. A threat of force can
be a very effective-but ultimately non-forcible-means of settling a
dispute.160 As such, a threat of force may (admittedly, somewhat
counterintuitively) facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts. A
basic tenet of the UN system is that states are obliged to resolve their
disputes peacefully.' 6 ' It seems both logical and desirable to view the
threat of force as a lawful, non-forcible defensive option. Quite
162
simply, "successful deterrence prevents war."

VI. THE CRITERIA FOR SELF-DEFENSE INVOLVING
THE THREAT OF FORCE

As previously concluded, there is no legal requirement that selfdefense actions constitute a use of military force, and, in the majority

See id. (treating threats of force and the use of force the same); Military and
156.
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 227
(June 27) (stating that a threat of force "is equally forbidden by the principle of non-use
of force").
157.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
158.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
159.
CONSTANTINOU, supra note 81, at 123.
160.
Sadurska, supra note 3, at 246-47.
161.
The most obvious expression of this obligation being Article 2(3) of the UN
Charter.
Myers, supra note 3, at 178. On the "virtues" of threats of force generally
162.
(even potentially unambiguously unlawful threats), see Kritsiotis, supra note 3, at
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of instances, it is desirable that states exercise the inherent right of
self-defense by way of a threat of force rather than an actual use of
force.
This Part addresses the somewhat more problematic issue of how
to assess such a manifestation of self-defense. Against what criteria
should the lawfulness of a countervailing threat, avowedly made in
self-defense, be tested? As has already been noted, this Article starts
from the position that self-defense manifested by a threat of force
should be analogous to self-defense manifested by a use of force and,
therefore, that the same criteria should be applied to determine
lawfulness. This analogy is conceptually logical, because if a threat
and a use of force are equally breaches of Article 2(4)-and are thus
potentially equally exercises of Article 51-then the same criteria
should apply to either manifestation of self-defense. More practically,
there is little specific guidance in conventional or customary
international law as to how to assess threats in self-defense, and an
analogy to the use of force in self-defense thus offers a useful
framework. Traditional forcible self-defense provides an "identifiable
normative anchor .. . to which the threat or threats of force can be
tied."'6 3 However, this analogy is not as straightforward as it sounds.
A. In Response to What?
The first challenge is to determine what may trigger a lawful
threat of force in self-defense. Rather self-evidently, a response taken
in self-defense must be taken in response to something.164 Logically,
this must be as true for a threat of force as for an actual use. A
threat of force that is not correlated to some prior delict by the
threatened party cannot conceptually be defensive; such a threat
would simply be unlawful under Article 2(4).165
Part III.A noted that traditional forcible self-defense cannot be
taken in response to merely any use of force against the responding
state; instead, an armed attack-a grave use of force-must have
occurred. 166 Indeed, even those who make the controversial claim of
anticipatory self-defense cannot sidestep this requirement of
gravity.167 In other words, if forcible self-defense in response to a

Kritsiotis, supra note 3, at 311.
163.
DINSTEIN, supra note 42, at 183-84; Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self164.
Defence in UN Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9,
20-22 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986); David J. Scheffer, The Use of Force After the Cold
War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order, in RIGHT VERSUS MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 109, 137 (Louis Henkin et al eds., 1991).
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain from the threat
165.
or use of force . . . .").
See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
166.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
167.
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threat is lawful, it is only lawful in response to a threatened armed
attack. 168
An assessment of the lawfulness of a threat made in self-defense
requires a determination of the "type" of delict that may be responded
to with a countervailing threat.
There are numerous options
available and little guidance as to which of these options are
appropriate. As such, a conclusion must be reached based upon a
combination of common sense and our pervading analogy with
forcible self-defense.
The following represent the possibilities of prior wrongs in
response to which a threat of force could be potentially lawful:
(1)

A grave use of force/an armed attack

(2)

A "less grave" use of force

(3)

A threat of imminent grave force/a threatened armed attack
that is imminent

(4)

A threat of imminent "less grave" force

(5)

A threat of non-imminent grave force

(6)

A threat of non-imminent "less grave" force

As previously noted, according to the ICJ, a threat of force is
lawful only if the use of the threatened force would be lawful. 169
Under a strict formalistic interpretation of this dictum, a threat
taken in self-defense would therefore be lawful only in response to
number (1) on the above list: the actual occurrence of an armed
attack. If a use of force is only lawful when an armed attack has
occurred, then that attack must have already occurred when the
threat to use force in response is made, otherwise at the time the
defensive threat was made the force threatened (if it actually
materialized) would be unlawful. If a responding state threatened
force before force had been used against it, this analysis would negate
the potential lawfulness of the threat. 170
For example, under this analysis, the 1990 buildup of coalition
troops and the threats made to the Iraqi regime as part of Operation
Desert Shield, prior to the commencement of Operation Desert Storm,
would constitute lawful threats in self-defense.1 71 Troop buildups of

168. - See supra note 112.
169.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, T 47 (July 8).
170.
A position noted as a possible argument but not actually adopted in
STORCHLER, supra note 3, at 50.
The buildup of coalition forces, primarily in Saudi Arabia, ultimately reached
171.
around 543,000 troops prior to the actual use of force. Barry R. Schneider, Deterrence and
Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War (U.S. Air Force
Counterproliferation Center, Couterproliferation Paper No. 47, 2009) http://www.au.af.mill
aulawc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/schneider3.pdf.
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this kind can clearly be a type of unlawful threat of force, as
discussed in Part II.C. Yet, given that the ultimate use of force in
Operation Desert Storm was almost undeniably a lawful act of selfdefense,17 2 and given that these threats were made after the armed
attack against Kuwait, the threats constituted lawful self-defense.1 73
As Roscini writes, these threats were "lawful in the light of collective
self-defense,"' 7 4 even though the coalition states did not defend the
action in this way.
There is a caveat to this reading of the ICJ's dictum if one
accepts the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defense. This Article does
not take a position on this question, but it is argued that if one
accepts that anticipatory self-defense is lawful, the threat being
responded to in self-defense must be a threatened armed attack and,
moreover, the threatened armed attack must be imminent.17 5 If the
use of force in response to the threat of an imminent armed attack is
lawful, then, under the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, a threat in
response to the threat of an imminent armed attack (number (3))
must be equally lawful.' 7 6 As an example of the type of action here
envisaged, Constantinou highlights the threatening military posture
adopted by Guinea in 1971 in the face of an imminent armed attack
against it, a posture that ultimately deterred the aggressor state. 77
In state practice, as previously noted, a threat of force is not
treated the same as a use of force.' 78 One may well argue on policy
grounds that it is undesirable to allow for the use of force in response
to a mere threat: the opponents of anticipatory self-defense argue
that a good case can be made for limiting the use of state-directed

The legal basis for the coalition action in the Gulf was based both on
172.
authorization from the UN Security Council (following Security Council Resolutions
660 and 678) and collective self-defense. The United States, for example, was explicit
that Operation Desert Storm was a measure taken under Article 51. Alexander F.
Watson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations,
Letter dated Aug. 16, 1990 from the Charg4 d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc.
S/21537 (Aug. 16, 1990). In any event, the validity of the self-defense justification is
difficult to refute, given that Security Council Resolution 661 conspicuously reaffirmed
the right of individual and collective self-defense. S.C. Res. 661, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
SIRES/0061 (Aug. 6, 1990). As Gray points out, "The USA and the UK could act in
collective self-defense of Kuwait even before specific authorization . .. was given by the
Security Council." GRAY, supra note 73, at 125.
Roscini, supra note 3, at 237.
173.
174.
Id.
See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
175.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
176.
I.C.J. 226, 1 47 (July 8).
CONSTANTINOU, supranote 81, at 122.
177.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
178.
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This position
violence to responses to actual military force.179
becomes more difficult to maintain if the response is itself nonforcible. Anticipatory self-defense by way of a threat is likely to be
much more palatable than anticipatory self-defense by force, even to
those who reject, on policy grounds, the concept of anticipatory selfdefense. As the European Union's IIFFMCG argued in its report on
the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict:
At face value, [Article 51] implies that no justification can be gained for
any threat of force until an armed attack is underway, and not before.
However, it makes sense that a threat, narrowly construed to deter an
attack and thus to prevent an unlawful use of force, is not
prohibited.180

Another way of approaching the issue of "a threat in response to
a threat" is that-even if the notion of anticipatory self-defense is
rejected in the context of the use of force-a threat of force in
response to a threatened armed attack could be retroactively lawful.
In other words, the force threatened in response to a threatened
armed attack might not be lawful at the time that the defensive
threat is made, but if the threatened armed attack actually takes
place, then any (necessary and proportional) response would also
become lawful. A slightly less strict reading of the Nuclear Weapons
dictum "coupling" threats and use, then, would mean that potential
armed attacks could be responded to with potential uses of force, as
the actual manifestation of force in response would become lawful
should the armed attack in fact occur.
Therefore, a threat of force may be lawful if taken in response to
actions that can be classified as falling under numbers (1) or (3) on
the above list. This result appears logical and generally concurs with
the ICJ's position on the lawfulness of threats of force.' 8 In other
words, a strict application of the criteria for self-defense as they exist
for the use of force, coupled with the view that only threats of lawful
force are themselves lawful, leads to the conclusion that actual armed
attacks (number (1)) and probably also imminent armed attacks
(number (3)) can give rise to lawful countervailing threats. Yet, these
would be the only actions that could be lawfully responded to with a
threat, as they are the only two possible types of actions to which
actual defensive force might lawfully be used in response.
However, given that a threat of force in self-defense is of an
inherently different character than a use of force, it is possible to
stretch this argument further. The threat of force may form an

A useful summary of the various policy arguments against lawful
179.
anticipatory self-defense is provided by Lucy Martinez, September 11th, Iraq and the
Doctrineof Anticipatory Self-Defense, 72 UMKC L. REV. 123, 163-65 (2003).
2 IIFFMCG, supra note 61, at 236.
180.
For a discussion of the ICJ's position on threats and force, see supra Part
181.
II.B.
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acceptable response to actions other than an armed attack or a threat
of an armed attack. There are good policy grounds for arguing that
the use of force should only be lawful in response to extreme
situations of high gravity (in other words, situations involving an
armed attack); these arguments aim to limit the use of military force
whenever possible. 182 However, it seems illogical that if a state
suffers a comparably "minor"-but still actual-use of force against it
(number (2) on our list), then force cannot be threatened in response.
For example, a few troops controlled by state A are camped just
within state B's borders and have been involved in a minor border
incident with state B's forces. A "mere frontier incident" of this kind,
to use the term employed by the ICJ in the Nicaraguacase, 18 3 would
not allow state B to respond with force, because the incident would
not constitute an armed attack.184 Thus, if the threat of force is
lawful only if the threatened force is lawful, a threat by state A to
attack state B unless it removed its troops from state A's territory
would also be unlawful. A practical example of this scenarioalthough Iran has hotly rejected it-is Tehran's alleged supply of
logistical support and weaponry to insurgents operating inside both
Iraq and Afghanistan.18 5 Under a strict application of the notion that
a threat is only lawful if the force threatened would be lawful, any
threat to respond forcibly against Iran would be unlawful because
Iran has not committed or threatened an armed attack.
Yet, given that a threat of force is an action of less gravity than a
"less grave" use of force because no violence occurs at all, a good
argument can be made that a non-forcible threat in response to a less
grave attack should be seen as lawful. It must surely be acceptable
for a state to respond to violence in a manner that is nonviolent and
thus inherently less grave than the action to which it is responding.
State A should be entitled to indicate to state B that the frontier
incidents must end or a forcible response will result, irrespective of

This policy rationale is outlined, for example, by W. Michael Reisman, Old
182.
Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary
International Law and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 171, 194-97 (1988). See also
GREEN, supra note 75, at 135 (discussing the issue but not necessarily subscribing to
these policy considerations).
183.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 195 (June 27).
184.
See id. (stating that the scale of the border incident has a bearing on
whether it should be classified as an armed attack).
185.
For news reports on allegations against Iran, see Michael R. Gordon & Scott
Shane, U.S. Long Worried that Iran Supplied Arms in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/middleeast/27weapons.html?pagewanted=all;
Thomas Harding, IraqiInsurgents Using Austrian Rifles from Iran, TELEGRAPH (London),
Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1542562/lraqi-insurgentsusing-Austrian-rifles-from-Iran.html; Mark Townsend, Special Forces Find Proofof Iran
Supplying Taliban with Equipment to Fight British, OBSERVER (London), Jun. 22, 2008,
at 9.
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the fact that implementing that threat would not constitute a lawful
action of traditional self-defense. This result would not fall foul of the
policy objection to allowing the use of force in response to "minor"
186
attacks (the rationale behind the "armed attack" criterion).
As Myers put it, "aggression, and not [non-forcible] deterrence, is
the scourge to be eliminated by the world community."1 87 A threat
aimed at deterring any use of force must surely be a desirable
alternative to escalation of that force or a forcible response (which,
under the rules of self-defense, would be unlawful' 8 8 ). Indeed, given
the UN Charter's focus on the restriction of actual force, "one could
argue that holding the view that unilateral threats are conditional
upon a prior armed attack is incompatible with the rationale of the
Charter." 8 9
In practice, it is unlikely that a state will employ a threat as a
defensive measure if an armed attack has actually occurred (number
(1)). Although a non-forcible response to an actual armed attack is
conceptually possible (and potentially desirable), in reality once a
state has suffered a grave attack against it, in a majority of instances
the actual use of force will be required to meet the defensive necessity
Some scholars argue that the
caused by that armed attack.
occurrence of an armed attack itself establishes the necessity for the
use of force. 190 Although this Article takes the view that the criterion
of necessity does not inevitably correspond with the requirement of
an armed attack,191 in most instances an armed attack will give rise
to a necessity to use force. Therefore, the right to threaten force in
such cases appears largely redundant.1 92 For any right to threaten
force in self-defense to have practical worth, it is important for it to be
available in less serious instances, in which the actual use of
defensive force would be unlawful. It seems logical from a number of
perspectives, therefore, to hold that a threat of force should be lawful
if it is made in response to numbers (1), (2), or (3).
The question of whether this position should be further stretched
to encompass a response to an imminent threat of "less grave" force

See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
186.
Myers, supra note 3, at 156.
187.
Given that, as previously noted, under Article 51 forcible self-defense can
188.
only be taken in response to an armed attack, and that an armed attack is interpreted
to mean a grave use of force-thus excluding forcible responses to comparatively minor
attacks. See supranotes 78-83 and accompanying text.
STURCHLER, supra note 3, at 50.
189.
See, e.g., CONSTANTINOU, supra note 81, at 158.
190.
It is conceivable that an armed attack could occur without creating the
191.
necessity to respond forcibly given alternative non-forcible options. The ICJ has
confirmed that a distinction exists between the criteria of armed attack and necessity.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 194 (June 27).
STORCHLER, supranote 3, at 42.
192.
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(number (4)) is highly debatable. Again, it could be argued that, so
long as the defensive threat is necessary and proportional to the "less
grave" threat suffered, it is acceptable for a state to make such a
threat even though a defensive use of the threatened force in such
circumstances would be unlawful. However, the use of force in
response to a "less grave" threat would be doubly controversial, in
that it would be anticipatory and it would not be in response to a
(threatened) armed attack.
As such, allowing for responses to
imminent threats of "less grave" force would mean straying still
further from the ICJ's policy that the lawfulness of the threat of force
should correspond to the lawfulness of the use of force threatened.1 93
It does not seem possible to conclude with any certainty even whether
it would be desirable to allow for threatened responses to imminent
minor threats. Whether countervailing threats in response to "minor"
threats would lessen or increase the possibility of the actual use of
force can only be speculated. In any event, this conclusion would
considerably stretch the analogy to traditional forcible self-defense.
Having said this, Stfirchler and Myers make a distinction that is
useful in this context: both take the view when considering a response
to a threat of force (rather than an actual attack) that there is a legal
difference between a "purely" defensive response and a response
taken aggressively.' 9 4
In other words, a threatened defensive
response ("if your imminent threat manifests itself as an attack, then
we will respond with force") should be distinguished from an
aggressive threatening stance ("we are going to attack you because
you have threatened us").
The former action puts the threatening state on notice and is a
pure defensive deterrent: the threat is only that force will be used if
the threatening state uses force first. This type of response can be
seen, for example, in the countervailing threat made in December
2010 by South Korea towards North Korea following the North
Korean bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island.1 95
South Korea's
Defense Minister-Designate made clear that "[i]f North Korea
provokes again, we will definitely use aircraft to attack North
Korea."1 96 This defensive threat was clearly premised upon the
threat to which it was responding becoming manifest.
The latter type of response requires no further trigger: it
threatens force based on the initial threat alone and therefore

193.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
LC.J. 226, 47 (July 8).
194.
Myers, supra note 3, at 173 (making this distinction specifically with
regard to threats made by the United States directed against North Korea since the
Korean War); STORCHLER, supra note 3, at 250-51, 267-68.
195.
South Korea Vows Air Strikes if North Attacks, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11909581.
196.
Id. (emphasis added).
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amounts to flexing "military muscle aggressively." 197 This is well
illustrated by the threats made by Israel (following its destruction of
the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear power plant in 1981198) to use force against
other comparable installations in the region, which Israel also
perceived as threats.19 9 In this instance, Israel's countervailing
threats were made on the basis of the perceived threat of the nuclear
2 00
installations itself and required no additional trigger.
If one refers to this distinction, the difference between a lawful
and an unlawful "threat in response to a threat" becomes not based
on the "gravity" of the defensive threat, as it would be in the context
of the defensive use of force. 201 Instead, it is based upon the nature of
the threat taken in response. Such a distinction allows for threats in
response to "minor" threats (threats of imminent attacks of a lower
gravity than an armed attack), as long as the responses are directed
toward deterring the "less grave" use of force. This approach makes
sense because a threat of force-even if given in response to a threat
to use "less grave" force-is preferable to the actual use of force.
This distinction between deterrent threats and aggressive
threats, while admittedly somewhat artificial, offers a solution to the
question of whether states can respond to threats of "less grave" force
in kind. It also corresponds to an extent with the ICJ's policy that the
202
lawfulness of threats must be premised on the actual use of force,
because the threat of force in response to a "less grave" imminent
threat would be lawful only if used to deter an actual use of force
rather than to respond in kind to another threat. This more closely
links the response to the actual use of force in self-defense and thus
to the position of the ICJ.
However, the risk of allowing states to respond to any and all
threats (even threats of a very minor nature) is that this allowance
might lead to an escalation of threats in otherwise innocuous
situations, and this escalation could ultimately increase the
likelihood of the actual use of force. It is ultimately impossible, then,
to say with any certainty whether threats are (or should be) allowed
in response to "less grave" imminent threats, either as a matter of
law or as a matter of policy.

See Myers, supra note 3, at 173 n.234 (citing MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra
197.
note 3, at 61) ("[M]ilitary preparations ... are not a 'threat."').
198.
See supra note 105.
CORTEN, supranote 23, at 99.
199.
It is notable that the UN General Assembly took the unequivocal view that
200.
the Israeli threats were unlawful. G.A. Res. 38/9, 1 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/9 (Nov. 2,
1983) ("[A]ny threat to attack and destroy nuclear facilities in Iraq and in other
countries constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations .....
See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
201.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
202.
I.C.J. 226, 1 47 (July 8).
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Finally, it is argued here that a threat of force cannot be made in
response to a non-imminent threat, grave or otherwise. In other
words, a threat may not be made in response to actions falling under
numbers (5) or (6) on the above list. This is in part because, as with
non-imminent "preemptive" forcible self-defense, 203 such a policy
offers states a green light to threaten to attack whomsoever they wish
based upon little or no evidence. In addition, threats made in
preemptive self-defense may again lead to the escalation of innocuous
situations, which could increase the likelihood of the use of force in
situations that otherwise may have led to no actual violence.
Of course, a threat to use force against a state based on a
perceived but temporally remote threat is far less consequential than
an actual use of force in the same circumstance. Nonetheless, it is
surely undesirable for states to resort to something expressly
prohibited by Article 2(4)204 in instances where no demonstrably
imminent threat has occurred: as Kritsiotis states, "otherwise we are
left with a situation where the concept of an unlawful threat of force
covers a staggering multitude of sins-all of which may be able to be
met by a threat but not a use of force in self-defense." 205
Myers appears to accept that a countervailing threat of force can
be lawful even in such temporally remote circumstances, again so
long as this threat is a latent one, indicating that force will be
employed only if an attack occurs. 206 However, the requirement of
necessity renders this proposition insupportable. 207 If the threat to
which a state responds is not imminent, there can be no necessity to
act in an otherwise unlawful manner. 20 8 The responding state can
attempt a lawful response because, if the threat is not imminent, time
is inherently on its side.

203.
Numerous scholars have critiqued the notion of forcible self-defense in
response to a non-imminent threat (what we here term "preemptive self-defense") on
the basis that it is open to abuse in this way. An excellent summary of this view in the
literature is given by TOM RUYS, 'ARMED ATTACK' AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE, 322-24 (2010).
204.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain from the threat
or use of force . . . .").
205.
Kritsiotis, supra note 3, at 308 (emphasis removed).
206.
See Myers, supra note 3, at 175--79 (discussing the legality of threats).
Sadurska similarly holds that a threat may be lawful even in circumstances that would
not justify anticipatory self-defense (in other words, in the case of a non-imminent
threat). See Sadurska, supra note 3, at 257, 260 (suggesting that the American
response to the Cuban Missile Crisis was justified in part because "legitimate concern
for security may be caused by situations that cannot justify even anticipatory selfdefense").
207.
On the requirement of necessity, see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying
text.
208.
On the basis that the necessity criterion requires that actions in selfdefense be taken only as a last resort. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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Thus, for example, the threats made by the United States
against Iran in response to the perceived threat of nuclear armament
must be a breach of Article 2(4), because the Iranian threat is at best
only potential and is certainly not imminent. 209 Irrespective of
whether Iran has breached its obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, 210 it is difficult to argue, until weaponization
takes place, 211 that it is "necessary" to threaten Iran with military
force.
The United States must first attempt other diplomatic
solutions. 2 12
In conclusion-based on this mixture of common sense and an
analogy with the law governing forcible self-defense-a state may
make a threat in self-defense in response to any actual use of force
against the state (grave or otherwise) 2 13 or an imminent grave threat
(a threatened armed attack). It is also arguable that a state may
respond to an imminent threatened less grave use of force with a
countervailing threat, so long as the threat in response is contingent
on an actual attack. However, a state may not respond to perceived
non-imminent threats with a threat of force.
B. Necessity and Proportionality
Even once it is established that a threat has been made in
response to an acceptable forcible action or threatened forcible action,
"[t]hreats issued [in self-defense] must still be necessary and
proportionate." 214 As in the previous subpart, it becomes clear from
an analysis of the criteria of necessity and proportionality that a
strict application of the ICJ's dictum-that the threat of force is

209.
See Julian Borger, US Will Take "Crippling Action" if Iran Becomes
Nuclear, Says Clinton, GUARDIAN (London), July 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/jul/22/clinton-protect-gulf-iran-nuclear; Colin Brown, Bush Threatens Iran
with Military Action, INDEPENDENT (London), Jun. 17, 2008, at 6.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729
210.
U.N.T.S. 161.
Here, we use the term "weaponization" to mean that a state not only has
211.
weapons grade uranium but also has the missiles or other platforms capable of
delivering that payload. See William Walker, InternationalNuclear Relations After the
Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions, 74 INT'L AFF. 505, 518 n.33 ("Weaponization
refers to the insertion of warheads in operational delivery systems.").
Another useful example in this context is the international response to the
212.
threats made by Israel to use force against nuclear installations in the Middle East,
following its 1981 attack on the Osiraq reactor in Iraq. These threats were clearly
made in response to a non-imminent perceived threat. It is therefore notable that the
Israeli threats in response were condemned as unlawful by the General Assembly. See
supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Stiirchler also takes this position, but goes further than the present writers
213.
would by arguing that there is "no ambiguity of the law" at all with regard to whether
a threat can be made to coerce the discontinuation of an actual attack. STURCHLER,
supra note 3, at 265.
2 IIFFMCG, supra note 61, at 236.
214.
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lawful only if the force threatened is lawful 2 1 5-is
conceptually
impracticable. For example, under a strict interpretation of this
dictum from the Nuclear Weapons opinion, a threat made in selfdefense would only be lawful if it is necessary to use force, because
that is the only situation in which the use of force would be lawful. 216
Yet, a necessity to use force can exist only if there are no alternative
non-forcible measures available-such as, for example, the threat of
force. Thus, a strict reading of the Nuclear Weapons dictum creates a
paradox: a state may make a threat only once it is clear that a threat
will not suffice and that a use of force is the only reasonable defensive
option. The threat of force thus becomes obsolete as a defensive
measure, something that is undesirable, given that in certain
circumstances a defensive threat of force can deter actual use. 2 17
Conversely, it may well be necessary to threaten force when it is not
necessary to use it. 2 1 8
It is important to note that the necessity criterion is less crucial
in the context of the threat of force than in the context of the use of
force. The use of force, because of the harm that it causes, should be
restricted only to circumstances where it is unavoidable, whereas the
threat of force is less damaging. A better way of understanding
necessity in this context is by reference to the reasonableness of the
response, or the idea of "last resort." As discussed in Part V.A, for a
threat to be defensive, it must be made in response to a prior action.
For that response to also be necessary, it must be a reasonable
response to that wrong: the responding state must be able to justify
the threat made as a defensive measure-one directed at deterring

215.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 1 47 (July 8).
The necessity criterion undoubtedly applies to forcible responses taken in
216.
self-defense. For a discussion, see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
An example would be Guinea in 1971. See supra text accompanying note
217.
177.
218.
See, for example, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis concerning the deployment
of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuban territory. The United States viewed the weapons
deployment as an unlawful threat of force. U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 1025th mtg. at 6,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.1025 (Oct. 25, 1962) ("[Tlhe Soviet Union secretly introduced this
menacing offensive military build-up into the island of Cuba. . . ."). However, many
states viewed the quarantine measures the United States took in response, under
which vessels in the exclusion zone were threatened with coercive force, as being
lawful. See, for example, the positions taken by France, U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 1024th
mtg. at 3-6, UN Doc. S/PV.1024 (Oct. 24, 1962), and China, id. at 6. Had the United
States actually used force against Cuba, however, it would seem unlikely that this
would have been considered a necessary action given that non-forcible options
remained available. On the necessity criterion and the need for forcible self-defense to
be taken as a 'last resort," see supra text accompanying note 88. The availability of
non-forcible alternatives in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis can be seen from
the negotiations that ultimately resolved the crisis. For a critique of the diplomatic
resolution to the crisis, see Richard M. Pious, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limits
of Crisis Management, 116 POL. SCI. Q 81 (2001).
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the attack or threat. Moreover, there cannot be an obvious, less
drastic measure (such as an attempt at mediation) that the state
could reasonably take to achieve the same goal.
Although this approach treats the use and threat of force as
separate entities, it is still analogous to the way in which the
necessity requirement is applied to the use of force in self-defense.
The necessity of self-defense is determined by a context-specific
appraisal of the options available to the responding state and the
reasonableness of its resort to force. 2 19 Of course, measuring such
"reasonableness" is difficult given the flexibility and context-specific
nature of the question. 220 This difficulty is compounded when applied
to a threat-an action that is comparatively abstract in scope.
Therefore, the question of necessity is extremely flexible and
largely dependent on the acceptability of a threat in the eyes of other
states. Nonetheless, that acceptability is based, at least in part, on
whether the other states see the threat as meeting a defensive need,
or, in other words, whether it is an action of last resort. This concept
is illustrated by the United Kingdom's threats of force against
Argentina during the 1982 conflict over the Falkland Islands.
Following the Argentinean invasion, British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher made clear that Argentinean forces would be forcibly
removed from the Falklands if they did not withdraw from the islands
(including the exclusion zone created by the British around the
islands), 22 1 and this explicit ultimatum was coupled with the implicit
(but very notable) threat of increasing numbers of British forces in
the region. 222 Given that Argentina had already used force when
these threats were made, it was clear that the British threats were
intended as a final attempt at a non-forcible solution-a last resortprior to the use of force in self-defense. The British threats received

As this was phrased in the "Principles of International Law on the Use of
219.
Force by States in Self-Defence" document prepared by the Chatham House
International Law Programme in 2005 after a consultation with thirteen eminent
international legal scholars in the United Kingdom: "There must be no practical
alternative to the proposed use of force that is likely to be effective in ending or
averting the attack." Elizabeth Wilmshurst et al., The Chatham House Principles of
InternationalLaw on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 963, 966
(2006).
220.
A discussion of this difficulty can be found in the sources cited supra note
92.
As Thatcher stated: "If the zone is challenged, we shall take that as the
221.
clearest evidence that the search for a peaceful solution has been abandoned. We shall
then take the necessary action. Let no one doubt that." Margaret Thatcher, Prime
Minister of Gr. Brit., Speech in the House of Commons (Apr. 14, 1982), available at
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104918.
222.
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT,
1982, 1 3 (U.K.), http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/D33C7BD518CA4DOD
AF6A6DCB29AD4335.pdf.
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essentially no international censure 223 and have been viewed as clear
examples of defensive threats. 224
Turning to the proportionality requirement, it is, of course,
possible to link the application of the criterion to the actual use of
force. However, the requirement of proportionality makes no sense if
threats must be premised upon the lawfulness of the force
threatened. This condition would take us into what Kritsiotis calls
"projected proportionality."22 5 Under a rigid reading of the dictum in
the Nuclear Weapons opinion, the assessment would be whether the
threatened force is itself proportional to the force (actual or
threatened) to which the threat responds. 226 Such abstractions make
for an impossible calculation that can be sensibly considered only
once actual uses of force have manifested; before this point, it is
impossible to know if the force threatened in response will be
reasonably proportional.2 27 This calculation is clearly not viable
when assessing threats at the time they are made or threats that do
not go on to become actual uses of force.
The primary issue with regard to proportionality is, therefore, to
what must the action be proportional? This Article has already
argued that in the context of a use of force in self-defense, an action
need not be proportional in scale to the armed attack to which it
responds; instead, any action in response must be proportional to the
defensive necessity created by that attack. 228 It stands to reason that
this also holds true for threats made in self-defense. Therefore, a
threat need not be commensurate to that to which it responds.
Instead, the threat must constitute no more than is required to meet
the defensive necessity. In other words, the threat made in response
must be an effective deterrent (to stop a future attack or to end an
attack, as the situation may require). This approach makes sense, as
a threat that is not a realistic deterrent has no value.
For example, state A could threaten to launch a nuclear weapon
against state B if state B had launched a large scale but conventional
attack against state A, provided that a nuclear threat is the only
reasonable means of deterring state B from continuing that attack.
Such a threat may not be commensurate in terms of scale, but it
would nonetheless be proportional. This result is logical because a
threat-even the threat of nuclear devastation-is not as onerous as
223.
Indeed, when the threats of force failed, the subsequent use of force was
widely accepted by other states. See Michael J. Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force
of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humanitarian Intervention, 27 HARV. INT'L. L.J.
621, 638 (1986) (discussing the general acceptance by other states of the lawfulness of
the actions of the United Kingdom in relation to the Falklands).
Roscini, supra note 3, at 237.
224.
Kritsiotis, supra note 3, at 311.
225.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
228.
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an actual attack. It is very difficult to say that a state should refrain
from an explicit threat of this kind if the threat is a reasonable means
of deterring continuing force. However, an actual nuclear attack in
such circumstances would likely be disproportionate to the defensive
necessity created by the prior conventional assault.2 2 9
A more concrete example occurred in 1990, when the United
States sent forces to Saudi Arabia in response to the appearance of
Iraqi troops along the Saudi border. 230 The initial appearance of
troops can clearly be perceived as an implied threat by Iraq.
Similarly, the United States' response of also positioning troops
(another implied threat) can be, under this analysis,
uncontroversially viewed as proportional to the Iraqi action. The
threat in response was enough to deter Iraq from acting on its
original threat to use force.23 ' However, had the United States
actually used force against the Iraqi troops, it would be highly
debatable whether such a response would have been proportional.
Again, because of the differences in character and effect between the
threat of force and the use of force, a strict holding that a threat of
force is lawful if the threatened force is lawful does not lead to logical
results.
Finally, in the context of "traditional" self-defense involving the
use of force, the criteria of necessity and proportionality together
require that the response be of a limited duration: a response in selfdefense must end when the defensive necessity ends. 23 2 As an
obvious extension of this principle, it is reasonably straightforward
that a threat of force must end when the action to which it was
responding ends.
There are, of course, problems inherent in
determining when a defensive necessity has ended, but these
problems are inherent in any defensive response. However, once
again, an additional problem emerges in the context of threats in selfdefense: it is also difficult to conclude when a countervailing threat of
force has ended.
It is usually reasonably clear when a use of force has ended, for
obvious reasons. However, in the case of a threat-implied or
explicit-the termination is far more difficult to determine. Most
threats to use force are open ended. For example, in the summer of
2008, prior to the August conflict in the Caucasus over the Georgian
229.
This theoretical example is developed from one set forth in Sadurska, supra
note 3, at 250.
230.
Thomas R. Pickering, Permanent Representative of the United States,
Letter dated Aug. 10, 1990 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/21492 (Aug. 10, 1990).
231.
This can be seen from the fact that Iraq opted not to mount an offensive use
of force against Saudi Arabia; instead its troops adopted a defensive posture in
response to the American military buildup. See Schneider, supra note 171, at 18
(describing Iraq's decision not to invade Saudi Arabia).
232.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

326

VANDERBILT>JOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44.285

breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia engaged
in a number of threatening activities: the buildup of troops, aircraft
surveillance, military posturing, and so on. 233 These actions were
directed both at the de facto autonomous regions and at the Russian
Federation itself 234
Given previous Russian threats toward
Georgia, 235 a good case can be made that the Georgian threats were
defensive in nature. 236 In any event, these threats constituted "openended" aggressive displays toward Russia, and this open-endedness is
a common manifestation of threats (defensive or otherwise) in state
practice.23 7
Yet, if a threat must end when the goal of deterrence has been
achieved, must it be explicitly retracted to conform to the
requirements for self-defense? Such retraction has little basis in
state practice; even in a defensive context, states do not retract their
threats. Indeed, from a strategic perspective, such a retraction is
undesirable. 238 It is therefore unlikely that a requirement for
withdrawal of threats forms an aspect of the law.
It is far more common for a retraction condition to be built into
the threat. For example, a state threatens that "unless you do X, we
will use force," implying that the threat is retracted once X is done.
This type of implicit conditional retraction is a clear feature of state
practice, as was evident in the conduct of the United States and the
United Kingdom in response to the Lockerbie incident of 1988. In
1992, Libya alleged before the ICJ that, inter alia, threats of force
had been made against it in an attempt to pressure the extradition of
its nationals that the United States and United Kingdom believed to
be the perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing. 239 A more recent
example is the buildup of coalition troops and the forty-eight hour

2 IIFFMCG, supra note 61, at 233.
233.
Id.
234.
235.
Id. at 234-35.
236.
Although, ultimately, the IIFFMCG report concluded that the Georgian
threats could not be justified in self-defense and were therefore unlawful. Id. at 23638.
237.
The IIFFMCG report noted that Georgian threats were probably intended,
at least inter alia, to pressure the removal of Russian peacekeepers that remained on
Georgia's territory after the Abkhazian conflict. Id. at 233. However, it is evident that
Georgia did not indicate that the threat would be "withdrawn" if the peacekeepers were
removed. Id.
See, e.g., THOMAS SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 44 (1966) (discussing
238.
"commitment").
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
239.
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J.
114, 6 (Apr. 14).
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ultimatum 240 given to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq prior to
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.241
However, it seems unlikely that states feel legally bound to tailor
their defensive threats in this way. Instead, this practice again
relates to the acceptability or reasonableness of the threat. When a
threat is made in a limited manner, explicitly with respect to a
defensive objective, then other states are far more likely to conclude
that the response is necessary and proportional (although states do
not actually use these terms in this context) and thus lawful.
The above analysis suggests that it is extremely difficult to apply
the criteria of necessity and proportionality to a countervailing
threat. A direct application of these criteria, as they are applied to
forcible responses, can lead to absurd results. Therefore, they must
be applied in a more flexible manner, analogous to the way they are
used in "traditional" instances of self-defense, but with reference to
the reality that threat and use of force may need to be treated
differently.
C. Note on Collective Self-Defense
Before concluding, it is worth noting that this Article does not
deal directly with the possibility of collective self-defense through
threats. 242 However, it is clear that states do threaten to use force on
behalf of other states-take, for example, the 1990 coalition threats
against Iraq as part of Operation Desert Shield.24 3 Additionally, it is
possible that a militarily "weaker" state could threaten to invoke
forcible collective self-defense. That is to say, a state that is unable to
defend itself could potentially threaten an aggressor with the
possibility of declaring itself the victim of an armed attack and
requesting the forcible aid of a more powerful benefactor.244
However, the question of collective self-defense through threats is not
discussed here, and is left for others to further consider.

A discussion of which can be read at Bush Gives Saddam 48 Hours to Leave
240.
Iraq, CNN (Mar. 18, 2003), http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.speech/
index.html.
241.
Of course, the authors would argue that this particular threat was a
violation of Article 2(4) in any event, on the basis that the actual use of force envisaged
by the threat (and ultimately employed) in this instance was, in our view, unlawful.
This is not a debate to enter into here, but for an analysis of the lawfulness (or
otherwise) of Operation Iraqi Freedom, see DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, FROM '9-11' TO THE
'IRAQ WAR 2003': INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 53-67 (2004).
242.
The UN Charter explicitly provides for collective self-defense. U.N. Charter
art. 51.
243.
See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
244.
The ICJ held in the Nicaraguadecision that, for collective self-defense, the
victim state must declare itself to have suffered an armed attack and explicitly request
the aid of the state acting on its behalf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 11 195, 199 (June 27).
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VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that a threat of force made for the
purpose of self-defense is not only conceptually possible, but that it
may in many circumstances be desirable from a policy perspective.
Permitting the use of defensive threats of force has the advantage of
upholding the cornerstone principle embedded in Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter, because it is a non-forcible alternative to military action.
As a result of the varied typology of threats of force, it is difficult
to determine what behavior may constitute a lawful defensive threat.
Specifically, while the literature and jurisprudence of the ICJ have
alluded to the notion of a "threat of force in self-defense," it is
largely unclear how the lawfulness of such an action is to be assessed.
To determine the lawfulness of a threat of force that is made in
self-defense, this Article has adopted the starting proposition that
such an act must comply with the requirements of traditional
"forcible" self-defense. This analogy logically flows from both the
wording of Article 2(4) and the jurisprudence of the ICJ (particularly
in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion). It is also the best guide as
to how defensive threats should be regulated, given that states have
not been explicit about the criteria in customary international law.
However, this analogy only takes us so far. A direct application of the
ICJ's finding that a threat is lawful if the force threatened is lawful
(and vice versa) can lead to counterintuitive outcomes because of the
inherent consequential difference between threatened force and
actual force. As such, this Article has applied the analogy to forcible
self-defense in a nuanced manner, with consideration of this
difference throughout.
As discussed in detail in Part VI, the main complexity in this
context lies in determining what actions may justify the threat of
force in self-defense. We have argued that-subject to the criteria of
necessity and proportionality-a defensive threat would be lawful if it
were made in response to three types of action: (1) a grave use of
force/an armed attack, (2) a "less grave" use of force, and, finally, (3) a
threat of imminent grave force/a threatened imminent armed attack.
It is also arguable that a threat should be lawful when made as a
response to (4) a threat of imminent "less grave" force, but only if the
threat is purely a deterrent. The acceptability of countervailing
threats in response to threatened imminent "less grave" force is far
from clear, however, and would essentially turn on policy arguments.
If the threat of force constitutes a response to a perceived nonimminent threat (grave or otherwise),. we argue that the threat taken
in response would be unlawful.
In addition, as with forcible self-defense, countervailing threats
must meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality. However,
again, for defensive threats, strict adherence to these requirements as
they would be applied to force in self-defense is not entirely
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appropriate. These criteria are essential reference points for an
analysis of defensive threats, but they cannot be applied in exactly
the same way as they are to the use of force; application of necessity
and proportionality, again, must reflect the practical difference
between threatening to "push the button" in self-defense and actually
doing so. Necessity is therefore akin to the "acceptability" of the
threat and whether it meets a genuine defensive need.
Proportionality is based not on the scale of the future force but rather
on what is required to deter aggressors. Finally, it would seem that
there is no requirement (or at least no explicit requirement) to
withdraw a threat after the defensive necessity has been met.
Ultimately, although threats of force are prima facie unlawful
under the UN Charter, it is clear that states do make defensive
threats of force and these threats are often accepted as lawful. This
is true in spite of the fact that such actions are not generally framed
in the language of self-defense. There remains little to indicate what
differentiates unlawful threats under Article 2(4) and acceptable
forms of non-forcible deterrence, but it is apparent that, to some
extent, the existing law governing forcible self-defense actions can be
applied to clarify the lawfulness of defensive threats.

